We develop a simple model of the effects of reputation on prices. An increasing fraction of consumers who are "naive" (less informed about quality) results in a stronger sensitivity of prices to ratings of quality. We then argue that this may be a factor in price dynamics for goods that become more widely traded as a result of globalization. We then provide some empirical analysis of these ideas using data on prices and Robert Parker's ratings of wines. Wine prices are strongly related to ratings, and even more so for higher quality wine categories. In addition, changes in Parker ratings for the same wine result in large price changes. Price elasticities with respect to ratings have risen dramatically since 1993. One plausible explanation for this is the growing globalization of the fine wine market, which increases the prevalence of naive wine consumers. (JEL Classification: D8, F1, L1, Q1)
I. Introduction
Every bottle of wine is different. That is true for a collection of bottles of the same wine (region, vintner and vintage), but even more so across types of wine. Subtle differences in terroir, weather, harvesting, production, blending and aging can cause important differences in the quality of wine. These traits make wine an extremely complex product with wide variance in quality. Thus assessment of the quality of a bottle of wine can be very difficult for consumers, and wine prices may reflect reputation. That reputation may be based in part on the region, the vintner, or recommendations of wine experts such as Robert Parker.
Reputation and wine ratings are likely to be especially important for less experienced buyers, who know less about specific regions, vintners, vintages, etc. For these reasons, the wine market is an interesting setting in which to explore the economics of reputation.
Globalization has dramatically increased the demand for wine worldwide. The best wines now have strong markets in Moscow, Beijing, or Sao Paolo. Many wine producers export a substantial fraction of their production. For example, French wine is now exported to over 200 countries (Crozet, Head and Mayer, 2009) . It is commonplace to find wine from Australia, Chile, California, France, Italy and many other regions on the shelves of stores in Singapore, Copenhagen, or Chicago. Ten years ago this was much less so, and twenty years ago even more unlikely.
Buyers in new markets are likely to have less experience with wine than typical buyers in more mature markets. Many Europeans grow up with wine as a regular feature at the family table, and with extensive exposure to different varieties and regions. Experiences of this kind are much less common in the United States and other areas, and nearly unheard of in Asia. "Naive" consumers are thus more likely to rely on published wine ratings, especially those of the well known expert Robert Parker. Globalization of the wine industry will increase the proportion of naive consumers, which may lead to interesting effects on wine pricing. Prices may be more strongly related to wine ratings, particularly for the highest quality wines. In addition, prices may be more responsive to new information, such as a change in wine ratings. In this paper, we explore these issues.
We first present a simple model of the pricing of wine based on reputation. There are two types of consumers, naive and sophisticated. Naive consumers have less precise estimates of the quality of a given bottle of wine. They rely more on reputational information, such as Parker ratings. The equilibrium price of wine then depends on the proportion of consumers who are naive or sophisticated, among other variables. The greater the proportion of buyers who are naive, the greater the reliance on published ratings. In addition, relatively more naive buyers in the market implies that wine prices become more sensitive to new information (a change in rating). We argue that these dynamics are likely to be reflected in the current wine industry, as globalization brings new and relatively naive buyers into the market.
We then provide some evidence related to these ideas using data on Parker ratings and wine prices from a sample of red wines from France, Spain and California. We show that the relationship between prices and Parker ratings has increased over time, especially for the highest quality wines. In addition, we find that the price elasticity of fine wines with respect to Parker ratings has increased over time. Our results are consistent with our hypothesis that globalization of the wine industry has increased the proportion of naive wine consumers, thereby increasing the role of reputation (Parker ratings) for wine pricing. Unfortunately, we do not have data on imports and pricing of wine across regions. Therefore our findings are only suggestive. Our model and empirical evidence suggest that further interesting research can be done on the effects of increased international trade on wine, or other goods for which quality assessments and reputation are important.
II. Model

A. Supply and Demand
In this section we present a simple model of the effects of different types of consumers on wine prices. Shapiro (1983) is a classic early entrant in the economics of reputation; for an excellent survey see Cabral (2005) . The model is in many ways complementary to that of Crozet, Head and Mayer (2009) . They analyze the effects of heterogeneous firms on international trade, and show that higher quality wines are more likely to be exported. Our work is also related to Schumacher (2009) , who shows that uninformed consumers may motivate firms to exert more effort in producing quality products, exerting a positive externality for informed consumers. Roberts and Reagans (2007) present evidence that the relationship between wine ratings and price depends in part on the extent of critical exposure that a producer's wines have received in the past. We focus on heterogeneity of consumers. Naive consumers are less informed about wine quality than sophisticated consumers. For this reason, they respond more to wine rankings, and to changes in those rankings. While we pose the model in terms of the market for fine wines, and also relate it to international trade, the model may be relevant for any industry in which quality is an important, varying and uncertain product characteristic, and consumers vary in the precision of their estimate of quality.
Wine is of uncertain quality. The only two attributes that consumers care about are the mean and variance of this quality, μ and σ 2 . A consumer's assessment of wine quality ~N(μ, σ 2 ). Consumers have a private taste for wine, based on their utility and budget, distributed τ U[-t, +t] across consumers. They are willing to pay more for a wine with better expected quality, but are also risk averse, with coefficient of absolute risk aversion r. The maximum amount a buyer is willing to pay for a bottle of wine is τ + μ -½rσ 2 .
Assume two types of consumers, naive and sophisticated. Of the total population N, a fraction η are naive. Naive and sophisticated consumers are identical in all respects except for information about wine quality. Their estimate of the quality of a given wine may differ, with μ n less than, equal to, or greater than μ s . In general there seems to be no reason to presume that naive consumers are biased relative to sophisticated consumers, so we will assume in most of our discussion that μ n = μ s . However, naive consumers are less informed. The two types of buyers differ in the precision (variance) of their estimates of wine quality, with σ n 2 > σ s 2 . Thus, they have the same risk aversion, distribution of tastes for wine, and generally in their mean assessment of the quality of a given bottle of wine. This simple approach highlights the role played by uncertainty (σ 2 ) about the quality of wine. Note that these assumptions imply that if they have the same expectations about a wine's quality, a naive consumer is less likely to buy that wine than is a sophisticated consumer, because of their greater risk. Naive consumers who do buy a given wine will have higher average taste for wine τ than will sophisticated consumers who buy that same wine.
Consider the pricing of a specific type of wine, with supply B bottles. Supply is fixed to capture the fact that a specific type of wine (region, grape, etc.) has very inelastic supply (even in the long run for many wine regions). Price P clears the market, with supply equal to total demand by naive and sophisticated consumers (Pr(·) means probability):
We focus on interior solutions and equilibria with P > 0. Algebra yields the price:
( ) Assume in what follows that naive and sophisticated consumers have the same average estimate of a wine's quality, μ n = μ s = μ. In that case price simplifies to:
We can now state some predictions (not all are testable with our data, but those could be with other data). Wine prices are rising in expected quality by either consumer type. They are declining in the scarcity of the wine (B/N). The model predicts that price increases in overall population N, but we are ignoring the increase in supply of competing products that would surely occur as the population grows, so this is misleading. Prices are declining in risk aversion and the degree of uncertainty that sophisticated consumers have about the particular wine.
The model predicts that wine prices decline in the degree of additional uncertainty that naive consumers have about wine quality compared to sophisticated consumers. This suggests that over time, as new consumers become more experienced with fine wine, the market should gradually move toward one that is more like the market prior to globalization (unless substantial additional naive consumers keep entering the market as globalization moves to new regions).
What about the potential effects of globalization? This would be reflected by an increase in η , since most or all of the increase in N would be naive consumers. Wine prices should decline in the proportion of consumers who are naive. This is because naive consumers require a larger risk premium (lower price) in order to consume wine, as they have less precise estimates of quality than do sophisticated consumers. If globalization has led to increases in prices of fine wines, according to our model that would be driven by greater total demand, though mitigated by a higher proportion of naive consumers.
B. The Effect of Wine Ratings
What is the effect of information on the reputation, and hence the price, of wine? Assume that a wine may receive a rating R (e.g., from Robert Parker). Just like consumers, the rating agency estimates the quality of the wine with some error, R~N( , ). μ σ 2 R However, the rating has two advantages. First, the agency hires an expert such as Robert Parker. Second, the expert is able to taste the wine (which is an experience good), discuss the wine with the vintner, and so forth. This access to information, combined with experience or expertise at tasting wine, implies that the expert's ranking has higher precision (lower variance) than those of either naive or sophisticated consumers:
If a wine receives a rating, consumers now have two assessments of the wine's quality: their own and R. Standard Bayesian updating implies that both naive and sophisticated consumers update their prior based on R, but that naive consumers give greater weight to the rating since their estimates of quality have lower precision. If R = μ, the expected quality of the wine does not change. If R > μ, both types of consumers increase their valuation of the wine's quality, but naive consumers increase their valuation more. The opposite holds if R < μ.
More interesting is the effect of the rating on the riskiness of purchasing the wine. For either type of consumer, i = n, s, the variance σ iR 2 in their estimate of wine quality after R is observed becomes:
From this we see that the variance of the quality assessment falls for both types of consumers, but falls more for naive consumers. Putting these two effects together, the expression for the change in the market price of wine upon publication of a rating R equals:
The price rises or falls to the extent that the rating is a surprise, R ≠ μ. The price also tends to rise with a rating because it lowers the risk to consumers of purchasing the wine; the last two expressions in (2) are both positive. This latter effect implies that a random sample of wines that received ratings should have higher average market prices than if unrated. From (2), we have two predictions. First, rated wines should have higher prices after controlling for other variables, including independent measures of quality. Second, and not surprisingly, the higher the rating the higher the price. More interesting is how the effect of a wine rating varies with the proportion of naive consumers:
In other words, the greater the fraction of naive consumers, the greater the effect of a rating on the price of the wine. The intuition for this should be clear: naive consumers have relatively diffuse priors, so they give new information greater weight than do sophisticated consumers. The greater the fraction of consumers who are naive, the greater will be the effect of rating on price.
Similar dynamics would apply if the good received a second rating, either by a different agency or an updated rating by the same agency (in our data, some wines are rated more than once). However, subsequent ratings would be given less weight, since the consumer's posterior estimate of quality after the first rating has already improved in precision. Therefore, we expect that second or third ratings would have a smaller impact on price. A qualification if this prediction were tested empirically is that the set of wines that receive updated ratings is not likely to be a random sample. It may be that the original rating is now deemed a "mistake" by the rater for some reason, or it has been discovered that the wine is aging differently than expected. Whatever the cause, selection bias in which wine receives more than one rating might imply that additional ratings are given more weight rather than less. Which effect dominates is thus an empirical question.
This implication is relevant for thinking about the effects of globalization on wine pricing. Globalization brings new consumers. These new consumers are, by and large, uninformed and lack confidence in purchases of wine, a good with high variance in quality. The proportion of wine drinkers who are relatively uninformed about wine quality is likely to have grown rapidly as a result of globalization. The fraction of sophisticated wine consumers has been high in Europe for a long time. In the United States, wine consumption and production has risen for many years, so it is plausible that the fraction of sophisticated consumers is now relatively high, though not to European standards. However, wine is traded internationally. Wine already on one continent is unlikely to be shipped to another continent to arbitrage price differences, but producers face the trade off each year of shipping their product to different economies for sale. Therefore, they will respond when, say, demand in China rises relative to demand in France. For this reason it seems likely that the fraction of naive consumers worldwide will affect the relative price of various wines, and how they respond to Parker notes or other wine ratings. This seems especially so for better quality wines, which are more likely to be shipped overseas (shipping costs will be a smaller fraction of total value). That said, it would be interesting to see if wine prices are more sensitive to ratings in countries where wine consumption has grown more rapidly in recent years. Unfortunately, our data do not allow such a test.
Our model does not predict a separate effect of total growth in consumers on the effect of ratings, given the simple functional form we assume (the fraction of naive consumers drives our predictions), and that we ignore parallel increases in supply. It is likely that growth in the total market for wine will lead to greater sensitivity of price to reputation / rating. One reason is that growth in absolute numbers of consumers means that those who buy a wine of given quality have higher average marginal utility from that wine -the equilibrium price sweeps an increasingly smaller fraction of the right tale of the consumer taste distribution τ.
Our model is a simple one of pricing based on a wine's reputation. Rosen's superstars model (1981) would yield similar implications. For example, he emphasizes that imperfect substitution between quality-differentiated products implies convexity in a consumer's value of a good as function of quality. He similarly argues that some goods have a public good aspect of joint consumption. It is possible that this is true for high quality wines, due to either literally sharing a good bottle with friends, or to "snob effects." We ignored this possibility by assuming that willingness to pay for wine is linear in μ. Such effects would only increase the importance of quality, and signals about quality such as wine ratings, for pricing. Thus, they would be likely to reinforce our predictions.
We have assumed that naive and sophisticated consumers have the same distribution of tastes τ for wine. More realistically, sophisticated consumers are likely to have higher average taste, since those who enjoy wine more are more likely to accumulate experience and information on wine quality over time. Allowing the mean value of τ to differ between the two groups would not affect our conclusions.
The model could easily be generalized to a distribution of consumers of varying degrees of naiveté or sophistication about the good, instead of only two groups. In that case, the price would still be determined by market clearing, but total demand for the good would be the integral over demands by consumers with different degrees of information (precision about wine), and over tastes if mean values of τ were also allowed to vary. Once again, this would not change our general conclusions.
Finally, such a distribution of consumer naiveté or sophistication could be endogenously derived by modeling the consumer's sophistication as habit formation (Becker and Murphy, 1988) combined with investment in information. Taste τ could be viewed as a form of human capital with an initial endowment. Consumers with greater initial taste would drink more wine for the same budget, and gradually develop additional wine human capital. Their stronger taste for wine and greater wine human capital would both increase the returns to investing in information about wine quality, which would reduce the variance of the consumer's estimate of quality. τ would rise over time, σ 2 would fall over time, and σ 2 would fall more rapidly with time the larger the consumer's initial endowment of τ. Then, the distribution of sophistication about wine would be a function of the initial endowments of τ, rate of accumulation of wine human capital, cost and benefits of acquiring information about wine quality, and the rates at which new consumers enter and old consumers leave the market. While such extensions would be interesting, we do not expect that they would alter our predictions.
III. Data
We extracted the information available on the website eRobertParker.com regarding all tasting notes for Californian, Spanish and Bordeaux wines (Parker, various years) . The data were collected during the fall of 2006 and spring of 2007. These tasting notes were published in the Wine Advocate or in books written by Robert Parker. Table 1a shows the number of observations by "regions" as defined by Robert Parker.
We know the tasting date (month, year), the Parker note, the name of the wine, the vintage, the region, and the average quality of the vintage for the year. We also have an estimated retail price in the U.S. for most wines. We can therefore run regressions of price on ratings as repeated cross-sections and look at the evolution of the sensitivity. 1 An interesting feature of the data is that Parker sometimes tastes the same wine from the same vintage more than once, so that we can observe the dynamic effect of a change in opinion. 2 We are also interested in prices differences of wines from the same vineyard but with different vintages and Parker ratings. 1 Unfortunately, this measure of price does not fully capture the dynamic adaptation of prices following new information. In related work (Tapia and Warzynski, 2006) , we also used a panel of prices of Bordeaux wines from one of the main brokers in Bordeaux. The dataset provides "en primeur" and spot prices for 254 châteaux (estates) over 16 vintages, starting in 1982 (this dataset is well known and used extensively in the wine economics literature; e.g., Hadj Ali et al., 2008) . Spot prices are available quarterly from July 1996 to December 2000. We found qualitatively similar results. 2 In our model a change in Parker rating should have the same general effect as that of an initial rating. However, the effect should be smaller, since the prior will include the original Parker rating and be given more weight (higher precision) than in the case where the consumer had not had access to a rating. Age is the year of the Parker points and price data, minus the vintage: it is the age of the bottle of wine. For virtually all observations, the data include Parker points, ranging from 64 to 100, and an estimate of the price in the US, ranging from $2 to $1,295 per bottle (prices are converted to 2006 dollars using the year-average CPI for all consumers). Many wines were rated more than once (in some cases, more than twice). Roughly one third of the observations, over 3,000, are updated points and prices.
In some analyses we use a baseline measure of "reputation" of the wine. We explored various measures, but the Reputation variable used here is the number of times a vineyard received a Parker note above 90. This is an individual indicator of the reputation of the vineyard rather than of the specific bottle of wine or a specific region. It may also be viewed as a measure of past performance of the vineyard, whereas Parker points is a measure of current performance. For both reasons, we expect wine prices to be more strongly related to Parker points than to Reputation. Table 3 presents regressions analyzing the relationship between price and various measures of quality: age of the wine; Reputation; and Parker points. We use natural logs of price, Reputation and points in all analyses and plots. The first four columns provide regressions of ln(Price) on the three available measures of quality. For ln(Points) and ln(Reputation), the coefficients can be interpreted as estimates of price elasticities. The most interesting results in those columns are the effects of reputation and Parker points. The effects of Parker points are striking. They are very strongly related to price; indeed Table 3 Relationship Between Price and Quality Dep. var. = ln(Price) Dep . the elasticity is estimated to be about 7. This effect diminishes when we control for Reputation and age of the wine. In fact, we observe that all three measures are positively related to the price of the wine, suggesting that both current rating and past reputation are important. Nevertheless, Parker points have a much stronger effect than Reputation, as expected.
IV. Results
A. Effects of Quality on Price
The fifth and sixth columns examine the effect of changes in Parker points on changes in the price of wine. As predicted, we find a similar effect: as a wine's rating changes, its price tends to change strongly in the same direction.
B. Trends in Effects of Quality on Price
Figures 1 and 2 build on this basic analysis by asking whether the relationship between price and measures of wine quality has changed over time. This is predicted as long as we are correct in assuming that there has been an increase in the proportion of naive consumers over time. For these figures, regressions similar to those in Table 3 were run separately for each year and regional group indicated. Those regressions had either ln(Price) or the change in ln(Price) as the dependent variable. In all cases regressions controlled for age and age². Figure 1 shows how the price elasticity of Reputation evolved over time. In this plot we are able to show California and French wines separately. We observe a clear upward trend in the effects of Reputation on wine prices in both regions and for the sample as a whole. This figure indicates that reputation has a much stronger effect on wine prices in 2006 than it did in 1993. A similar conclusion emerges in Figure 2 , which shows how the price elasticity of Parker points evolved over time (here we also include Spain despite the fact that we have less observations than for the other regions). In all four series, there is a notable positive trend since the beginning of the sample. However, there is some suggestion that the effect of Parker points may have begun to decline in the last few years for California wines at least. It is difficult to say without additional data. Nevertheless, the long term trends are quite clear. Figure 3 depicts the effects of a change in Parker points on the change in wine price, using region-year regressions similar to those employed for Figures 1 and 2 . The incremental effect of a change in wine rating on the wine's price has also risen dramatically over time.
These figures collectively provide suggestive evidence for our prediction that indicators of the reputation of the wine will have stronger effects over time due to globalization. It is striking to see how much the effects of reputation and Parker points on wine have risen over time. Note that an alternative explanation could be that the reputation of Parker has increased over time. Without detailed data about vineyard-level export behavior, it is hard for us to distinguish between these two explanations. We return to this problem below.
C. Effects of Points on Price for Wines of Different Reputations
The literature on the economics of reputation tends to focus on the role of reputation in distinguishing high quality goods. One reason for this is that adverse selection almost always works through low quality goods attempting to pollute the market for high quality goods, and not the reverse. In addition, it seems likely that consumers will be more risk averse about uncertain quality for more costly expenditures. Our model is too simple to All CA Plots of coefficients of ln(Points) on ln(Price) from yearly regressions that include controls for age and age². French and Spanish wines were included in the "All" category, but were not plotted separately due to small sample sizes in many years.
capture such issues. However, models of quality and trade such as Crozet, Head and Mayer (2009) do predict that higher quality goods are more likely to be exported. In addition, Roberts and Reagans (2007) argue that wines paid greater attention by critics should have a stronger relationship between quality ratings and price. Higher quality wines are more likely to get frequent exposure by critics. Coupling these papers with our argument that globalization increases the fraction of naive consumers, we predict that the empirical effects we found earlier in this section should be larger, the higher the quality of the wine category examined.
In Tables 4-5 we examine this hypothesis. We analyze whether wines with higher Reputation exhibit stronger effects of Parker ratings on price than wines with lower Reputation. We divide the sample into three groups. Wines with no previous measure of Reputation (no Parker notes above 90) were classified as in the "Low" reputation group (41.7% of the sample). Those with less than 10 Parker notes above 90 were put in the "Medium" group (43.6%). Wines with more than 10 observations above 90 were classified as in the "High" group (14.7%). Table 4 repeats regressions of changes in ln(Price) on changes in ln(Points) and a quadratic for age, divided into the three reputational groups. The only variable that matters consistently is the change in ln(Points). This variable is always highly significant, confirming once again the importance of Parker points for wine prices. Most importantly, however, this variable's coefficient rises dramatically from the Low through High reputational categories (and is significantly different when comparing across regressions). Parker point changes do not have strong effects on lower quality wines, but do have large effects on Medium quality wines. They have stronger effects still on the highest quality wines. These findings accord with our prediction. All regressions control for region and year of points/prices. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance level 1%(***), 5%(**), 10%(*).
Our final table looks at the evolution of these parameters over time (Table 5) . We see that the sensitivity increases over time for all three groups. We might have suspected that sensitivity would increase faster in the segment with high reputation than in other segments. That is true for Medium quality wines, but not for High quality wines. It is possible that high quality wines are such a small fraction of the overall market, and so expensive, that they have few naive consumers. If so, globalization may affect the market for what we are calling Medium quality wines more than the rarified category of High quality wines. In any case, the results in Tables 4 and 5 do indicate that sensitivity of prices to Parker points is greater, the higher the quality of the wine as a category. That is consistent with our globalization story, when matched with the observation that higher quality wines have higher rates of exportation than lower quality wines.
V. Conclusions
In this paper, we developed a simple model of reputation in which some buyers are naive and some are sophisticated. Naive buyers have greater uncertainty about the quality of wine. This means that equilibrium wine prices depend, in part, on the proportion of naive buyers and their relative lack of confidence in their estimates of wine quality. Both groups incorporate indicators of quality such as an expert's rating of the product. For that reason, ratings lower product uncertainty and tend to increase the price of the good. However, naive consumers give more weight to the rating since they are less confident in their own quality assessment. This implies that prices are more sensitive to ratings of quality, the greater the proportion of consumers who are naive.
We presented empirical analysis of these ideas by estimating the effects of Parker ratings on wine price; of the change in rating on wine prices; and how those effects vary with different categories of quality. Wine prices are positively related to both age and Reputation, a measure of collective reputation of a vineyard in the past. However, they are much more strongly related to Parker ratings of wine. In addition, wine prices are highly elastic with respect to changes in Parker ratings over time. These findings are in accordance with our model. Finally, we find that prices are more sensitive to ratings, the higher the quality category examined.
We used this model to make predictions about the effects of globalization on wine prices over the last two decades, under the reasonable assumption that globalization increases the fraction of buyers who are "naive" about wine quality. Unfortunately we do not have data on international trade in wine, so our arguments will require better data in the future to come to firm conclusions. Instead, we presented empirical estimates of the trend in sensitivity of prices to Parker ratings. There are dramatic positive trends in these sensitivities since 1992. While there may be other explanations, given the time period analyzed it seems quite plausible that increasing international trade in wine is one important factor. Hopefully further empirical work can be done to study this question.
